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Economic theory predicts that a reduction in background risk should induce financial risk-
taking, particularly for individuals with low stock market participation costs. Hence, health 
insurance coverage could affect financial risk-taking by offsetting health-related background 
risk. We use a regression discontinuity design to examine whether Medicare eligibility at age 
65 increases stockholding in the US and find that it does so for those with college education, 
but not for their less-educated counterparts who face higher stock market participation costs. 
Our results are unlikely due to the reduction of medical expenses associated with Medicare 
coverage because the latter does not affect bondholding. 
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1. Introduction  
Public policy interventions often have unintended consequences. Health care policies in 
particular may have broader implications, for example, for household risk-taking and financial 
investing, that have not been fully explored.1 This may be the case as health-related background (i.e., 
not fully insurable) risks are likely to affect financial risk-taking,2 and especially so among older 
households, given that health care costs strongly depend on age.3  
In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by employing a credible identification strategy to estimate 
the impact of Medicare on stockholding. Specifically, we exploit the fact that the health insurance status 
of the US population changes drastically at age 65, when most individuals become eligible for Medicare. 
This institutional feature lends itself to a regression discontinuity design, such that variations in health 
coverage near the age 65 threshold are arguably “as good as random”. We use data from the US Health 
and Retirement Study (HRS), a nationally representative survey of older households that provides 
detailed information on their demographic characteristics and financial decisions. Importantly, the older 
segment of the population holds the largest share of assets in the United States (78% of gross equities 
and 75% of net worth held by the total population per the 2007-2010 Survey of Consumer Finances).  
As shown by Card, Dobkin and Maestas (2008, henceforth CDM), Medicare eligibility improves 
health insurance both in terms of coverage (which becomes nearly universal after age 65) and generosity 
(generally measured as the probability of having two or more health insurance policies). Interestingly, 
CDM also show that Medicare benefits not only the more disadvantaged but also whites and the better 
educated, among whom the rise in multiple coverage at age 65 is sharper than among their counterparts 
from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Consistent with these patterns, Barcellos and Jacobson (2015, 
                                                            
1 In contrast, much academic, policy and media attention has been devoted to the relationship between health 
insurance and labor market outcomes. See Gruber and Madrian (2004) and Madrian (2007) for reviews and the 
references therein. 
2 For example, per Himmelstein et al. (2009), “62.1% of all bankruptcies in 2007 were medical” in the United 
States. 
3 Indeed, nearly half of lifetime medical expenditures are incurred after age 65 and, for those who survive to age 
85, more than one-third of their lifetime expenditures will accrue in their remaining years (Alemayehu and 
Warner, 2004). Recent simulations also indicate that, in 2009, a typical married couple age 65 had a 5% probability 
of lifetime uninsured health care costs over $311,000. If nursing costs are included, this figure reaches $570,000, 
while by 2007, at the peak of the stock market, less than 15% of households approaching retirement had 
accumulated that much in total financial assets (Webb and Zhivan, 2010). 
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henceforth BJ) find that Medicare eligibility reduces out of pocket spending significantly more for the 
highly educated than for those with less than high school. 
Economic theory predicts that a reduction in one type of background risk should induce 
investment in risky assets, even if the reduced risk is uncorrelated with that of the risky assets (Gollier 
and Pratt, 1996). Risks related to income, entrepreneurship and health have often been suggested as 
instances of a background risk that is negatively associated with risky asset ownership.4 A lower 
background risk, however, may not suffice to induce investment in risky assets. In fact, despite the 
equity premium, most US households do not hold stocks, and in several standard life-cycle portfolio 
models incorporating background risk the optimal level of risky assets is zero after the introduction of 
participation costs (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995; Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002).  
Transaction costs are a leading explanation for the reluctance of households to hold stocks 
because, as Haliassos (2002) points out, a risk averse utility maximizing household will always want to 
invest even a small amount in stocks due to the equity premium. This result was first pointed out by 
Arrow (1974), and holds in the presence of risky labor income, and also of background risk uncorrelated 
with stock returns. The intuition is that starting from a position of no stock investment, a marginal 
addition of a risky asset will not contribute to consumption riskiness, while it will allow the household 
to take advantage of the equity premium. Therefore, if the household does not invest in stocks, then it 
is likely that such investment entails some cost.5 
Hence, the existence of participation costs makes the question of whether the willingness to take 
financial risks is increased due to the drop in background risk stemming from Medicare’s increased 
insurance coverage generosity ultimately an empirical one. 
                                                            
4 For instance, Rosen and Wu (2004) find evidence that older households in the US that report having health 
problems are less likely to invest in stocks. In addition, Coile and Milligan (2009) show that the death of a spouse 
and the experience of an acute health condition, like a stroke, are associated with a significant portfolio 
rebalancing. In line with the notion that a reduced exposure to background risk should make individuals more 
willing to bear other risks, Fairlie, Gates and Kapur (2011) find that business ownership rates increase from just 
under age 65 to just over age 65. See also Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1996), Heaton and Lucas (2000), Viceira 
(2001), Edwards (2008), Yogo (2016), Atella, Brunetti and Maestas (2012). 
5 For example, Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) estimates that participation costs of 50 US dollars (in 2000 prices) are 
enough to explain the non-participation of about half of US households in 1989 and 1994. 
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In addition, given that individuals eligible for Medicare face lower out of pocket medical 
expenditures, they should have more funds at their disposal, which should, in turn, make them more 
likely to invest in risky assets. 
Our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first one to analyze the effect of Medicare on 
stockholding, and contributes to a small and incipient literature that links health insurance and financial 
decisions.6 Our primary contribution is to use a highly credible regression discontinuity (RD henceforth) 
research design that rests on mild identification assumptions to answer a policy relevant question: does 
the onset of Medicare induce stockholding?  
We find that Medicare eligibility induces households with college education to invest in stocks 
Our preferred estimates suggest an increase in total stockholding (that is, direct, through mutual funds 
and through IRAs stock ownership), ranging from 7 to about 14 percentage points (pp) for this education 
group, depending on the method used. On the other hand, we find no effect of Medicare on stockholding 
for those whose members have not finished college. Our results imply that the reduction in background 
risk due to Medicare eligibility suffices to overcome the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs that inhibit 
participation in the stock market only if these costs are low enough, as is the case for individuals with 
a higher educational attainment (see Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995). As we discuss below, however, our 
results likely represent conservative estimates of our effect of interest due to some features of our set-
up. Hence, getting health insurance coverage might affect financial risk-taking also for those with less 
than college education. 
An additional factor that might drive our results is the reduction in expected out-of-pocket 
(henceforth OOP) medical expenditures that Medicare coverage entails. This should lead, however, to 
                                                            
6 Several influential papers have examined the first-order effects of Medicare on health and health care utilization. 
Card, Dobkin and Maestas (2009) find that Medicare eligibility significantly reduces the death rate of severely ill 
patients who are admitted to hospitals through the emergency department for non-deferrable conditions. An earlier 
study by Decker (2002) also focuses on a subpopulation whose immediate mortality experience is more likely to 
be affected by Medicare-related changes in health care (breast cancer patients) and provides evidence of better 
outcomes for those over 65. However, when focusing on the overall population, Finkelstein and McKnight (2005) 
find that the introduction of Medicare does not reduce the relative mortality of individuals over 65 and Card, 
Dobkin and Maestas (2004) show that the age profiles of self-reported health status are relatively smooth around 
age 65. In contrast, conclusions regarding health care utilization are unambiguous: the onset of Medicare age-
eligibility significantly increases the use of health services (Card, Dobkin and Maestas, 2008). 
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increased investment also in less risky financial assets such as bonds. We find no effect of Medicare 
coverage on bondholding, and thus surmise that our results are primarily driven by the Medicare-
induced reduction in background risk. 
A paper that is similar in spirit to ours is Goldman and Maestas (2013, henceforth GM), who also 
explore the relationship between health insurance coverage and financial risk-taking. While GM 
provide insightful evidence, our work differs from theirs in several important ways.  
First, our work is the first to investigate whether Medicare, the second largest social insurance 
program in the United States, may have unintended consequences on the financial decisions of the 
elderly. Instead, GM focus on the implications of obtaining additional supplemental insurance7 among 
Medicare beneficiaries. They find that this supplemental insurance has an economically sizeable and 
statistically significant effect on risky asset ownership. Interestingly, given that the heterogeneity in 
terms of coverage and its characteristics is much wider between Medicare beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries than among Medicare beneficiaries, one would expect the onset of Medicare eligibility to 
have even larger effects on portfolio decisions than those estimated for supplemental insurance (among 
65+ Medicare beneficiaries). In any case, the potential consequences of Medicare on financial markets 
is an important aspect that policy makers may need to be aware of and give consideration when 
contemplating future health care reforms.  
Second, we importantly differ from GM in terms of identification. Estimating the causal effect 
of health insurance coverage on financial risk-taking behavior is complicated by the fact that insurance 
coverage is an endogenous variable, and there are concerns over the potential confounding role of 
unobservables, such as individual health status and risk aversion. GM use an IV approach to address 
the endogeneity of supplemental insurance choice among Medicare beneficiaries. Specifically, they use 
as instruments the variation in county-level non-Medicare HMO market penetration and in state laws 
that limit the structure of risk pooling by insurers. Therefore, their identification strategy crucially relies 
on the assumption that neither of these instruments correlate with risky asset ownership other than 
through their effect on supplemental insurance choices. By contrast, we rely on a RD design that 
                                                            
7 Through Medigap, an employer, or a Medicare HMO. 
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exploits the Medicare-induced discontinuity in health coverage at age 65 to identify the causal effect of 
interest under seemingly mild assumptions compared to those needed for other non-experimental 
approaches (Hahn et al., 2001).8 
In work subsequent to ours, Ayyagari and He (2017, henceforth AH) study the effect on portfolio 
choice of Medicare Part D, which provides a prescription drug benefit and was introduced in 2006. 
Using HRS data and a difference-in-differences (DiD) identification strategy they find that Medicare 
Part D increases the propensity to invest in risky assets. Our identification strategy on the other hand 
does not rely on the parallel trends assumption required in DiD estimation, while our treatment is 
coverage by the main Medicare program, and not just Part D.  
In another related paper subsequent to ours Angrisani et al. (2016), using HRS data and fixed-
effects estimation techniques, investigate whether Medicare coverage mitigates the negative effect of 
bad health on financial risk-taking, and whether this interaction effect is stronger for those who had no 
health insurance coverage prior to the time they became covered by Medicare. Hence, they do not 
estimate the direct effect of Medicare coverage on financial risk-taking, but they still find that Medicare 
coverage makes those in poor health more likely to assume financial risk. 
Finally, we examine different subgroups that, in line with economic theory, should exhibit a 
different propensity to hold stocks in response to Medicare eligibility. Specifically, stock market 
participation costs which can be both pecuniary (e.g., brokerage fees) and non-pecuniary (e.g., time 
spent to find the most suitable assets to invest in, to consult with financial advisors, to monitor market 
developments) typically vary by education. A higher level of human capital is associated with higher 
financial resources and more efficient information processing, making both these costs easier to bear. 
Hence, we examine different education groups, as it is natural to expect the impact of a reduction in 
background risk on stockholding to differ by education due to the education-induced variation in stock 
market participation costs. In line with this idea, we find that getting Medicare coverage induces 
                                                            
8 Some earlier studies have also used a regression discontinuity design that exploits the onset of Medicare at age 




stockholding for those with college education, for whom informational and pecuniary stock market 
participation costs are relatively low, but not for their less-educated counterparts. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some details on the 
institutional features of Medicare. We discuss our data and empirical methodology in Section 3 and our 
main results in Section 4. In Section 5 we describe various specification and robustness checks that we 
have performed, while Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Medicare eligibility, health insurance and health expenditures of the elderly 
Medicare, which represents by far the largest government insurance program in the US, was 
implemented in 1965 to provide health insurance coverage at older ages.9 Thanks mainly to Medicare, 
only about one percent of older households (65+) are uninsured (Madrian, 2007).  
Individuals become eligible for Medicare when they turn 65 if they or their spouses have worked 
for at least 10 years in Medicare-covered employment. Individuals under 65 years of age are also 
eligible for Medicare if they are getting Social Security Disability Insurance or if they have end-stage 
renal disease and either they or their spouses have met the Medicare work requirement. Eligible 
individuals who enroll in Medicare obtain hospital insurance (Part A) for free, while Part B, which 
covers doctor services, outpatient care, and some preventive services that are not covered under Part A, 
is available for a modest monthly premium.10  
It is well documented that health insurance coverage status changes remarkably at age 65 as most 
people become eligible for Medicare. For example, Card, Goldman and Maestas (2004, 2008 and 2009) 
show that this is indeed the case using data from the National Health Interview Survey. Figure 1 
confirms this pattern for our representative sample of elderly households from the HRS. Medicare 
coverage rises by 73.4 percentage points at age 65, from 15.4% to 88.8% among 64- and 66-year olds, 
                                                            
9 Medicare accounts for a substantial and growing share of total health care spending in the US. Specifically, 
Medicare spending, which represented 20 percent of national health spending in 2012, grew 4.8 percent to $572.5 
billion in the same year (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2013). Moreover, according to the 
Congressional Budget Office (2013), federal spending on the government’s major health care programs is 
projected to rise substantially relative to GDP. 
10 Additionally, U.S. citizens and legal aliens with at least five years of residency who do not qualify can also 
enroll in Medicare by paying monthly premiums for both Parts A and B coverage. 
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respectively. Since Medicare enrollment prior to 65 is lower among college-educated households, the 
coverage gap between 64 and 65 is even more pronounced for them (80 pp) than for non-college 
educated households (72 pp), which is consistent with Disability Insurance enrollment patterns for 
minorities and less educated individuals (Autor and Duggan, 2003).  
Note also that, although Medicare unquestionably increases access to coverage (see, e.g., CDM), 
individuals very often choose to supplement it by purchasing Medigap plans, enrolling in Medicare 
Advantage, a Medicare HMO or obtaining retiree health insurance through employers (Baicker and 
Levy, 2012).  
In addition, CDM show that the onset of Medicare improves coverage generosity especially for 
better-off population groups like college graduates and whites, who are more likely to obtain 
supplemental coverage (i.e., to report two or more policies) after age 65.11 As a consequence of 
obtaining more generous coverage, these groups are also found to have a much higher increase in 
relatively high-cost procedures —including hospitalization for bypass surgery and hip and knee 
replacement— relative to their less educated and non-white counterparts.  
Importantly, there is also evidence that Medicare offers older people significant protection 
against medical expenditure risk and financial strain. Specifically, BJ find that, at age 65, OOP 
expenditures drop by about 33% at the mean ($326) and 53% ($1,730) among the top 5% of spenders. 
Moreover, they also find large reductions in several measures of financial strain at age 65. In sum, while 
it is well established that Medicare eligibility significantly affects health insurance (in terms of both 
coverage and generosity) and medical expenditure risk, it remains to be analyzed if and the extent to 
which it impacts financial risk-taking behavior. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1  Data 
                                                            
11 Such multiple coverage schemes are often considered very generous and even “too much insurance”, as they 
not only provide additional benefits but often cover the cost-sharing and deductibles in the basic Medicare 
package, which lacks a cap on out of pocket spending (Baicker and Levy, 2012). 
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We utilize data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a nationally representative, 
longitudinal survey offering detailed information on household socioeconomic characteristics, income, 
and wealth. The survey was launched in 1992 and interviews every two years about 20,000 Americans 
aged 50 and older. The HRS is the dataset that best serves our purposes because it collects high quality 
data on both household portfolio and health insurance for a representative sample of older households 
and it records the month and year of birth of all household members, which is crucial for the 
implementation of the RD method in our context.12  
HRS respondents are asked in every survey year whether they are covered by Medicare. In 
addition, households are asked whether they own stocks in different forms: i) directly or through mutual 
funds (i.e., it is not possible to distinguish between stocks held directly and stocks held through mutual 
funds); ii) since the 1998 wave, through Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), which represent the 
most common form of stockholding in the U.S.13 More specifically, IRA owners are asked whether their 
funds have been allocated mostly in stocks, bonds or split between the two.  
One important advantage of using the broader definition of stockholding is that it is not affected 
by any misclassification by the respondents of one form of stock ownership into another. For example, 
if they invest in mutual funds through their IRAs they could conceivably report this investment when 
asked whether they own stock mutual funds. 
When comparing data before 1998 from the HRS and the Survey of Consumer Finances, which 
is the most comprehensive micro-data survey on assets in the US, we find that the prevalence of the 
first form of stockholding (direct or through mutual funds) is significantly overestimated in the HRS. 
On the other hand, the two datasets match very closely from the 1998 wave onwards for both forms of 
stockholding. This pattern implies that in pre-1998 waves numerous HRS respondents who held stocks 
through IRAs reported them as being held directly or through mutual funds, most probably because the 
                                                            
12 Data from the HRS have been extensively used in empirical household finance literature. For an early analysis 
of asset transitions among older households see Hurd (2002). See also, Hong, et al. (2004), Rosen and Wu (2004), 
and Bogan (2008) who examine, respectively, the effects of sociability, reported health, and internet use on 
stockholding decisions.  
13 See for example Christelis, Georgarakos and Haliassos (2011), who study household stock investing through 
different saving vehicles and show that the expansion in the pool of stockholders over the 1990s is mainly linked 
to the increasing number of households investing in stocks through IRAs. 
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question on stockholding through IRAs was not asked before 1998. Consequently, ownership of stocks 
held directly or through mutual funds is likely to be significantly overestimated in HRS waves prior to 
the 1998 one. In view of all the above, we opted to use data starting from the 1998 wave and up to the 
2012 wave in the RAND HRS files (i.e., we use eight waves in total).14 
The HRS collects information on health insurance and demographic characteristics of each 
member of a couple. As it is typical in surveys measuring household finances, information regarding 
wealth and its various components (including stocks) is jointly reported for couples. Hence, in the case 
of households formed by a married or cohabiting couple, one needs to decide how to link age, which 
triggers our treatment variable, to stock ownership.  
One possibility would be to treat each partner in a couple as a separate observation and assume 
that a couple’s stockownership status applies to both partners. However, even if stocks are jointly held, 
one cannot tell from the data whether both partners agreed on this decision, or whether they disagreed 
but one partner prevailed on the other, or whether one of the partners did not really have an opinion on 
the matter. Hence attributing a positive attitude to stockholding to both partners in the case of observed 
stock ownership in the couple is not warranted. Correspondingly, one cannot attribute a negative attitude 
to both partners when no stockholding is observed. 
In addition, as Lee and Lemieux (2010, LL henceforth) point out, one can think about a regression 
discontinuity design within a potential outcomes framework (Rubin, 1974). One key assumption needed 
in such a framework is that of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which states 
that the potential outcome of one unit is not affected by the treatment assigned to another one. This 
assumption is unlikely to hold in our set-up, given that one partner’s portfolio choices following 
treatment typically affect the choices of the untreated partner.15 
                                                            
14 The RAND HRS Data file is an easy to use longitudinal data set based on the HRS data. It was developed at 
RAND with funding from the National Institute on Aging and the Social Security Administration. For further 
information see http://www.rand.org/labor/aging/dataprod/hrs-data.html. 
15 De Nardi et al. (2014) provide evidence of substantial such spillovers in couples. 
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In light of the above, we conduct our analysis at the household level (i.e., by treating the two 
partners in a couple as one decision-unit.16 Specifically, we take the maximum age of the two partners, 
as crossing the age 65 threshold for the older partner surely represents a potential reduction in 
background risk and/or a potential reduction in medical outlays, while such reductions might not be as 
large for the couple when the younger partner crosses the same age threshold.  
Correspondingly to the household-level definition of the outcome, we define our treatment 
variable at the household level. Specifically, we use a binary variable denoting Medicare coverage in 
the household if any of the two partners in couple is covered. This definition covers the cases in which 
a younger partner is covered while the older is not, possibly due to an early onset of Medicare coverage 
due to disability. Another possibility would be to define Medicare coverage at the household level using 
only the information on the coverage of the older partner. In practice the two definitions are essentially 
equivalent, as in only 1.36% of married or co-habiting households aged 60-69 is the younger partner 
the only one covered by Medicare. Hence, the two alternative definitions lead to essentially identically 
estimates of the effects of interest.  
Therefore, the sample used in our baseline analyses consists of both singles and couples. Our 
conclusions remain basically unaffected when our sample is constrained only to singles and couples in 
which both partners are of the same age.17   
For completeness, we examine separately as outcomes the two possible stock ownership modes; 
direct or through mutual funds, and direct or through mutual funds or through IRAs. In what follows, 
we refer to the latter stockholding mode as stockownership in any form or total stockholding. 
Table 1 shows the prevalence of stock ownership for all households in which the oldest member 
is aged from 60 to 69 by type of stockholding mode and level of education, defined in the case of 
couples as the maximum education level over the two partners. We note that only about 45% of all 
                                                            
16 Choosing the financial respondent to represent a couple would not be a solution given that this designation 
applies to different partners across waves and is often assigned based on convenience, i.e., on who has more time 
available to be interviewed. 
17 In a previous version of the paper we showed results only for singles, for whom the choice of age is 
unambiguous, and, as a robustness check, we analyzed singles together with couples in which both partners have 
the same age (thus crossing the age 65 threshold together). Reassuringly, we reached similar conclusions to those 
in this paper. See Christelis, Georgarakos and Sanz-de-Galdeano (2014). 
12 
 
households in the sample invest in stocks in any form. The likelihood of holding stocks increases 
considerably with education, a finding that is well documented by the household finance literature.18 
Specifically, total stockholding rates are remarkably higher among college-educated households 
(71.4%) than among households with less than high school education (8.8%).  This data pattern is 
consistent, as discussed in the Introduction, with the fact that stock market participation costs go down 
with educational attainment. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
Our goal is to estimate the causal impact of having insurance through Medicare on stock 
ownership. To this purpose, we use a RD design.19  In our context, the basic idea behind the RD method 
is that eligibility for medical services through Medicare is determined at least partly by the value of a 
forcing or treatment-determining variable, which is age, being on either side of a fixed threshold (65). 
As we have shown in Figure 1, the probability of having Medicare does not change from zero to one at 
age 65; instead, there are individuals below 65 who already have Medicare coverage (about 8.5% in our 
sample), even if there is indeed a very large jump in the probability of being covered by Medicare at 
age 65. Given that there is no one-to-one correspondence between our treatment and the indicator for 
being at or above the RD threshold (i.e., being at age 65 or above), we use a fuzzy RD (FRD henceforth) 
design to estimate the impact of having Medicare insurance. 
  Our general framework is the same as that in BJ, so we adapt their equations (1)-(3) (pp. 47-48 
in BJ) to our question of interest. In particular, we postulate an equation for stockholding as follows: 
 𝑠 𝛼 𝑓 𝑎𝑔𝑒 , 𝝀 𝛽𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝛿𝑿 𝜀 , (1) 
where 𝑠  is a binary indicator denoting stockholding by household i, 𝑀𝑒𝑑 is a binary indicator 
denoting Medicare insurance, 𝑿 is a vector of covariates and 𝑓 𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝜸  a polynomial in age (in our 
baseline specification we use a linear term). As we are interested in estimating the effect of Medicare 
                                                            
18 See for example the empirical contributions in Guiso, Haliassos, Jappelli (2002). 
19 See for example Hahn et al. (2001), Imbens and Lemieux (2008), and LL, who provide a review of the issues 
in the implementation of RD designs and a guide to empirical practice. 
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on stockholding, our coefficient of interest is 𝛽. We estimate 𝛽 using fuzzy RD estimation, as 
implemented in Imbens and Lemieux (2008, p. 627). In the FRD design, we estimate the average causal 
effect of Medicare coverage as the ratio in the estimate of the jump at age 65 of risky asset ownership 
over the jump at age 65 in Medicare coverage. Computing this ratio is numerically equivalent to using 
a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimator, with an indicator variable taking the value 1 if age is not 
below the age 65 threshold as the excluded instrument (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008, henceforth IL; 
Hahn et al., 2001). Hence, our estimated effect is a local average treatment effect, that is, it is the effect 
that having Medicare insurance has on stockholding for those who get this insurance when reaching 65. 
This subsample is a very large one, as shown in Figure 1, and is also the relevant one, given that RD 
estimates an effect around the age 65 threshold.  
As pointed out in BJ (p. 48), the effect of the treatment, that is, having Medicare, captures a 
weighted average of the effect of coverage and of the effect of the increased generosity of Medicare. 
This is the case with the coefficient of any binary treatment when underlying this variable there’s 
another continuous one affecting the outcome (generosity in our case). 
As in BJ, one can also postulate a second equation that relates having Medicare insurance to 
being at age 65 or above, which is as follows: 
 𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝛾 𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 , 𝝁 𝜋𝑇 𝜑𝑿 𝑢 , (2) 
where 𝑇 is an indicator denoting being age 65 or above, and 𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝝁  an age polynomial. Combining 
(1) and (2) gives us the reduced form equation, which is also the one used for the sharp RD estimation, 
namely  
 𝑠 𝜔 ℎ 𝑎𝑔𝑒 , 𝝆 𝜏𝑇 𝜃𝑿 𝑣 , (3) 
where 𝜔 𝛼 𝛽𝛾, ℎ 𝑎𝑔𝑒 , 𝝆 𝑓 . 𝛽𝑔 . , 𝜏 𝛽𝜋, 𝜃 𝛼 𝛽𝛿, 𝑣 𝜀 𝛽𝑢 . Hence, sharp 
RD estimates in equation (3) the product of our coefficient of interest 𝛽 with the coefficient of the 
binary threshold in the equation for the treatment (the coefficient of being at or above 65 in our case). 
That is, sharp RD estimates 𝜏 𝛽𝜋. In other words, the sharp RD coefficient is the product of the 
coefficient of interest with another coefficient that denotes treatment uptake. Clearly, the sharp RD 
14 
 
coefficient is not any more informative than the fuzzy RD one in terms of the breakdown between 
coverage and generosity, and we are still interested in estimating 𝛽. 
One could be inclined to interpret the sharp RD estimate 𝜏 as an estimate of the effect of 
Medicare eligibility, that is, as an estimate of the intent to treat. This interpretation, however, would be 
erroneous because Medicare eligibility is not determined solely by being 65 and above. There are 
additional conditions that allow respondents to become eligible at ages younger than 65, such as getting 
Social Security Disability Insurance or having end-stage renal disease and having met the Medicare 
work requirement either on their own or through their spouse. These additional conditions make a non-
trivial number of individuals (as already stated, about 8.5% in our sample) covered by Medicare at ages 
below 65. Hence, being at or above 65 is not a necessary condition for Medicare eligibility, and thus 
the sharp RD (reduced form) equation (3) does not allow the estimation of the effect of Medicare 
eligibility, but only of the effect of being aged 65 or above.  
We are, on the other hand, interested in estimating the effect of having insurance through 
Medicare, and this is the reason why we choose fuzzy RD as our mainline estimation methodology. We 
show, however, in Section 4 the sharp RD results as well. The associated estimates are smaller than the 
fuzzy RD ones because they are the product of the latter with the change in treatment uptake (i.e., having 
Medicare) at the threshold, which is very large, as shown in Fig. 1, but smaller than one. 
An important feature of our set-up is the fact that the discontinuity threshold is determined by 
age. As LL point out, since the assignment variable is age, which cannot be manipulated, individuals 
cannot choose to be situated to the right or to the left of the discontinuity threshold. This is crucial for 
identification because the existence of a treatment being a discontinuous function of an assignment 
variable is not sufficient to justify the validity of an RD design. Moreover, as Lee (2008) shows, the 
fact that the variation in treatment (insurance coverage) near the threshold (age 65) is random as though 
it were a result of a randomized experiment is a consequence of individuals’ inability to precisely 
manipulate the assignment variable (age). 
It is also worth noting that, while individuals cannot manipulate age, they can anticipate the onset 
of the age-triggered treatment (i.e., Medicare in our case), and hence anticipate choices that are 
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influenced by it. In our context, this implies that respondents could assume additional financial risk 
before becoming 65 years old, as they anticipate that they will be eligible for Medicare when they reach 
that age, and thus their background risk will diminish accordingly. If present, this anticipation effect 
will reduce the change in the prevalence of stockholding at age 65, and hence our estimates should be 
lower bounds for the effect of Medicare on financial risk-taking.  
Furthermore, as LL point out, to the extent that the influence of the treatment induced by the 
discontinuity is not immediate but rather takes place over time, the jump in the outcome at the 
discontinuity point will again be reduced.20 In our context, this implies that if individuals decide to 
assume more financial risk with some delay after getting Medicare, then this delay will reduce the 
increase in the prevalence of stockholding at age 65. Hence, our estimated effect of Medicare on 
financial risk-taking through RD will likely be an underestimate of the overall effect over time.  
In addition, LL point out that one needs to check if there are any events other than Medicare that 
are also triggered at age 65 and that could also affect stockholding, thus acting as confounders for the 
effect of Medicare on it. In Section 5 we will discuss robustness checks that address this issue.  
One important concern in the application of RD designs, given that they focus on the average 
effect of the treatment for units with values of the forcing variable close to the threshold, is the issue of 
the sensitivity to the bandwidth choice. We present results based on the optimal bandwidth choice 
methodology proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014, henceforth CCT), and we also show 
results from local linear regression for various age ranges. 
Another important decision that we need to make is how to measure age, i.e., our running 
variable. Our dataset provides information on age measured in months, and thus we can also measure 
it bimonthly, in quarters, in six-month intervals or in years. As LL point out, if the running variable is 
measured in units that are too narrow, estimates can become very noisy. On the other hand, if the 
measurement units are too wide, then each age interval will contain observations that are further off 
                                                            
20 LL give as an example the effect of being eligible for Social Security on labor supply. As they point out, if this 
effect is not immediate but rather takes place over time, an RD estimation strategy will likely not find a decrease 
in working hours at the age of eligibility. 
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from the discontinuity threshold. To formally choose the age measurement unit, we follow the 
suggestion of LL and run regressions of our outcomes of interest on monthly dummies (our narrowest 
age measurement unit). Subsequently, we use joint F-tests to check whether all the coefficients of the 
dummies are equal to each other within a broader age-measurement unit (but differing across the 
broader units). For example, when we examine quarters, we test whether all the monthly dummy 
coefficients in each quarter are equal to each other, and do the same test for all quarters. If the p-value 
of the F-test indicates that the null of the equality of the monthly dummy coefficients in broader age 
measurement units cannot be rejected, then it would be advisable to measure age using this broader unit 
to reduce noise in our estimates. 
The p-values of these F-tests are shown in Appendix Table A.1, with Panel A depicting results 
for stocks directly held and Panel B results for stocks held in any form. Results clearly indicate that 
when age is measured in years or in six-month intervals the F-tests very often reject the equality of the 
monthly dummy coefficients within each year or six-month interval, and thus neither years nor six-
month intervals are appropriate age measurement units. When age is measured in quarters, the pattern 
is more varied, but low p-values are still relatively frequent, especially when analyzing stocks held in 
any form. In contrast, p-values of the F-tests are generally high when age is measured in bimonthly 
intervals. In light of these results, we use bimonthly intervals as an age measurement unit in our baseline 
analysis. In Section 5, however, we also perform robustness checks in which age is measured instead 
in monthly and quarterly intervals. 
As LL point out, covariates are not needed in the specification used in RD estimation. Hence, we 
estimate our baseline specification without any covariates, but we do include them in alternative 
specification to check the robustness of our results. Furthermore, following the suggestion in Lee and 
Card (2008), we cluster standard errors at the level of the age measurement unit, that is, bimonthly 
intervals in our baseline specification. 
As it is customary in the RD literature, we first show some graphical evidence. Specifically, we 
visually check for discontinuities in the distribution of the outcome variable at the threshold point. 
Figures 2A and 2B provide the relevant plots for the ownership of stocks and mutual funds and for 
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stockholding in any form, respectively. We also plot simple local linear and local squared polynomial 
regression lines, estimated using a quarterly bandwidth, as discussed above. We note that there is indeed 
an upward jump in the ownership of stocks held directly and through mutual funds (Fig. 2A) for the 
college educated subsample, but no such jump for the whole sample, or for any of the other education 
subsamples. The same pattern is observed for total stockholding (Fig. 2B). 
As we discuss in Section 4 below, our estimation results indeed reflect these observed data 
patterns. In addition, in Section 5 we estimate “placebo” RD models in which the threshold for Medicare 
eligibility is set at ages different than 65, and we show that the jump in stock ownership observed at 
age 65 among the college educated is not due to random data noise.  
 
4. Results 
We first examine the fuzzy RD results, shown in Table 2, for the whole sample as well as by 
education. As discussed in the Introduction, there are good reasons for studying financial risk-taking 
separately for groups having different levels of education. Specifically, the reduction in background 
risk (due to Medicare coverage) can have different implications for stockholding across investors 
bearing different pecuniary and non-pecuniary stock market participation costs that vary with education. 
We therefore show results for the whole sample as well as by education level. 
In Panels A.1 and B.1 of Table 2 we show results obtained through the CCT method, while in 
Panels A.2 and B.2 those obtained through local linear regressions. We let the CCT method choose the 
optimal age bandwidth, while we use five different age bands for the local linear regression, the 
narrowest being one year away from the discontinuity threshold in each direction (ages 64-65), while 
the widest is five years away (ages 60-69). The choice of age band creates a bias-variance trade off: the 
narrower the band, the more unbiased estimates will be, albeit noisier, while wider age bands will yield 
more precise estimates, but more likely to be biased.21  
                                                            
21 The optimal bandwidths produced by the CCT method are not displayed but they are available upon request 
from the authors. Sample sizes shown in all our tables denote the number of observations in the optimal bandwidth 
selected (CCT method) or in each of the age intervals (local linear regression).  
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Results using the CCT method suggest that there is no impact of Medicare coverage on the 
portfolio decisions of households who have not finished college, with the exception of total 
stockholding for those with less than high school education. However, the local linear results for this 
subsample are not statistically significant. Moreover, we show below that they are not robust to the 
addition of other covariates. In general, estimates are quite small in magnitude and almost always very 
far from achieving standard levels of statistical significance. Results for the whole sample are 
statistically significant in the CCT case for total stockholding and in various age ranges in the local 
linear regressions for both types of stockholding. Once more, however, these results are not robust to 
the addition of covariates, as shown below.  
The picture changes completely for college-educated households, where our estimates are 
sizeable and statistically significant. First, the CCT estimates are 11.1 and 14.8 percentage points for 
direct and total stockholding, respectively, both strongly statistically significant. Second, when using 
local linear regression (Panels A.2 and B.2 of Table 2), as the sample size increases as we sequentially 
depart from narrower age intervals, the estimated effect of Medicare on stockholding is reduced but is 
still sizeable. The median local linear estimate is about 7 percentage points for both types of 
stockholding, and again strongly statistically significant.  
These estimates are both statistically significant and economically important, especially when 
considering that the overall prevalence of direct and total stockholding for the college-educated is about 
48.7% and 71.4%, as can be seen from Table 1. Importantly, our results are also plausible given the 
sizable (especially for the highly educated) effects of Medicare on medical expenditure risk and 
financial strain previously uncovered by BJ (2015).  
We next show the sharp RD results, which, as already discussed, show the effect of being age 65 
and above on stockholding. As is well known, the sharp RD estimate should be smaller than the 
corresponding FRD one because it is not divided by the change in the probability of getting Medicare 
at age 65. This pattern is clearly present in the results shown in Table 3, as RD estimates are smaller by 




Importantly, our results are in line with other ones in the literature (even if they are neither easily 
nor directly comparable), and we argue they can even be viewed as relatively conservative in light of 
previous evidence. 
First, BJ (2015, Table 6, Panel B, column 6, p. 62) estimate that Medicare induces a sizeable 
reduction in out of pocket spending of 34% for those with more than 12 years of education. Hence, our 
sharp RD/reduced form effects (8-10%) for the highly educated subgroup appear plausible given this 
reduction in OOP expenditures.22  
Additionally, we compare our results with those of GM, who consider the subpopulation of 
Medicare beneficiaries and study how their willingness to hold risky assets is affected by their 
supplemental insurance arrangements.23  They find that HMO participation increases total stockholding 
by 13 percentage points in the general population. The prevalence of total stockholding in their sample 
is 50%, so this estimate implies a 26% increase in risky asset ownership.  
GM do not study how their results vary by education, so comparing their results with ours is not 
straightforward. Importantly, given that there is less heterogeneity in coverage and in generosity among 
Medicare beneficiaries than between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (the comparison we make), 
one would expect the onset of Medicare eligibility to have even larger effects on portfolio decisions 
than those estimated by GM for supplemental insurance (among 65+ Medicare beneficiaries). 
Interestingly, GM indicate that the decrease in OOP spending for those enrolled in an HMO (versus 
having just Medicare Part A+B) is 20% in their sample (while their estimated increase in stock 
ownership is 13 percentage points or 26% of total stockholding prevalence). The equivalent OOP 
decrease for the sample of highly educated individuals (the sample for whom we obtain significant 
results) computed by BJ amounts to 34%, i.e., much larger than the one in GM for the whole population. 
                                                            
22 There are two features worth noting: i) BJ (2015) use a sharp RD design, so it seems more suitable to us to 
compare their results with our sharp RD results; ii) GM mainly rely on data from the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey in their analyses because of its high quality data on health care spending, but they indicate that their results 
hold with the HRS (the same data that we use) and they show it in the Appendix. 
23 That is: being enrolled in a Medicare health maintenance organization or HMO, which offers the most generous 
coverage such that risk exposure is lowest; having supplemental insurance by a former employer or through a 
Medigap plan, such that risk exposure is moderate; or having no supplemental coverage on top of Medicare A and 
B package, such that risk exposure is highest. 
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Hence, one would expect that the increase in stock ownership for that group would be much larger than 
the 13 percentage points increase estimated by GM for the whole population. On the other hand, our 
estimated increase in stock ownership ranges from 7 (using the median fuzzy RD estimate from local 
linear regression) to 15 percentage points (using the CCT methodology) or 10%-21% of total 
stockholding prevalence for this subgroup. 
Hence, we conclude that, all in all, our 2SLS/fuzzy RD estimated effects are not too large 
compared to GM’s 13 percentage points (rather the opposite). We note that we compare their estimated 
effects with our fuzzy RD/2SLS results because they use an IV approach to address the endogeneity of 
supplemental insurance choice among Medicare beneficiaries. However, the comparison with our sharp 
RD results would only strengthen our point as they are smaller. 
AH study how Medicare Part D (which was introduced in 2006 with the aim of helping the elderly 
pay for self-administered prescription drugs) affected stock ownership among Medicare beneficiaries. 
Their main finding is that Part D increased stockholding by 2.25 percentage points, which amounts to 
a 4.5% increase with respect to the pre-2006 ownership rate of those 65 and older. Note, however, that 
the reduction in OOP spending induced by Part D for those 65+ is also smaller than the 34% reduction 
in OOP spending caused by Medicare for the highly educated estimated by BJ.  Additionally, in the 
Appendix AH show that they find no significant effect for those with less than a high school degree. 
They do not show the estimated effect for those with at least some college education, but it is expected 
to be larger than the 2.25 percentage points estimate they obtain for the whole sample.  Hence, given 
the larger drop in OOP in the college-educated subsample in our case, as well as the fact that we examine 
the impact of the whole Medicare program as opposed to only Part D, we consider our estimated 
(through sharp RD) 10 percentage points increase in stockholding to be a result compatible with the 
findings of AH. Note that, since they use a diff in diff estimator, we have compared their results with 
our sharp RD (reduced form) estimates. 
When interpreting our results, one should keep in mind that, as discussed in Section 4, they may 
underestimate the true effect of Medicare on financial risk-taking due to the possibility of anticipation 
of the stockholding decision before age 65, and the possibility that Medicare affects financial risk-taking 
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not immediately after eligibility but over a longer period. Hence, it could be the case that Medicare 
induces financial risk-taking even for those who have not finished college, but we are not able to 
uncover this effect because age is the assignment variable in our RD setup. The fact, however, that we 
find an effect for the group for which we expect it the most, i.e., the college-educated that bear lower 
informational costs, is congruent with the notion that such costs have an important and sizeable 
influence on financial risk-taking.  
 
5. Specification and Robustness Checks 
To check our results, we perform various robustness tests. Due to space constraints, we show the 
results of only some of them, but all are available from the authors upon request. 
We first check whether the jump in the prevalence of stockholding at age 65 observed in the 
college-educated subsample (as evidenced in Fig. 2A and 2B) is due to noise in the data. To that effect, 
we perform “placebo” RD estimations in the subsample of the college-educated and for age thresholds 
different than 65, starting from age 59 and until age 71, i.e., six years to the left and to the right of the 
age for Medicare eligibility. Each age interval is defined to the left or the right of age 65, as suggested 
by IL (Section 7.3), so as to avoid including in the estimation a point where the regression function has 
a discontinuity. We set the placebo thresholds equal to the median age of each age interval, again 
following IL. If the effect observed at age 65 is a genuine one, i.e., due to having Medicare, then there 
should be no effect observed at other age thresholds. Our results are shown in Table 4, for both kinds 
of stockholding (direct and through mutual funds, and total), and for both estimation methods (CCT 
and local linear regression). We find that in only one of the 40 possible combinations of age intervals, 
stockholding mode and estimation method at age thresholds other than 65 do we obtain a result 
significant at the 5% level. In contrast, and in line with the impact of Medicare on stockholding being 
genuine for the college-educated subsample, the results at age 65 shown in Table 2 are consistently 
strong and statistically significant. Hence, we conclude that there is little evidence that our results are 
due to noisy jumps in the data. 
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One additional specification test suggested by LL is to perform the estimation using additional 
covariates. Such covariates should not affect the consistency of the estimates. However, they could 
make them more efficient. To that effect, we add to our specification: time dummies, an indicator for 
being white, an indicator for whether the household contains a person with health problems as indicated 
by having at least one limitation in activities of daily living (ADLs), an indicator for whether the 
household is formed by a couple, and income quartiles. Our results are shown in Table 5. We find that 
our point estimates for the college-educated subsample are barely affected by the inclusion of these 
additional covariates. On the other hand, results for the whole sample and for the least educated 
subsample are now uniformly not statistically significant.  
We next examine whether Medicare induces investment in less risky assets like bonds. As 
discussed in the Introduction, one may expect the onset of Medicare to affect portfolio investment 
through two mechanisms. First, the onset of Medicare may also increase individuals’ willingness to 
hold risky assets because of its associated reduction in background risk. Second, since Medicare 
eligibility significantly reduces out of pocket expenditures (even more so for the better educated, as 
documented by BJ), eligible individuals will be less cash constrained and hence more likely to invest 
not only in stocks but also in bonds and/or other financial products. If we found a relevant impact of 
Medicare on the probability of holding bonds, which represent a less risky investment than stocks, this 
would suggest that increased risk tasking due to reduced background risk might not be the only factor 
driving our results for stocks. Results for bond ownership are shown in Table 6, columns 1-4, and they 
clearly indicate that we cannot reject the null of no effect of Medicare on bondholding. This suggests 
that the significant estimated effect of Medicare on stockholding is consistent with the notion of 
additional risk-tasking in view of a reduction in another source of background risk. Importantly, this 
evidence also suggests against the possibility that having more funds at one’s disposal may be the only 
reason behind our results for stockholding. 
A potentially interesting outcome is also the intensive margin of stockholding, that is, whether 
households increase their investment in stocks, conditional on owning them. Here, however, we run 
into a rather serious data problem: capital gains and losses were remarkably high during our sample 
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period, that includes the runup of stock prices in the late 90s, the crash of 2000, the recovery and 
subsequent runup till 2008, the large stock market crash of 2008-2009 due to the Great Recession, and 
the brisk recovery of the market from the second part of 2009 till 2012. Hence, stock amounts in the 
HRS are unlikely to solely reflect deliberate financial decisions made by households. Instead, variations 
in the extensive margin reflect both active investing and price changes. Unfortunately, the HRS does 
not gather separate data on capital gains and losses because respondents are asked about the value of 
investments at the time of the interview, and thus this value includes capital gains and losses. In any 
case, our results for amounts (in logarithms) of stocks directly held are shown in columns 5-8 and those 
for total stocks in columns 9-12 in Table 6. We observe that none of the estimates are statistically 
significant. However, given that the data do not allow us to attribute changes in amounts to deliberate 
actions by households, we cannot give our results a behavioral interpretation. 
As discussed in Section 3, we need to consider other possible factors that might change at age 65 
and influence the decision to own stocks. The most salient such factor is household income. If such a 
change occurred, it could be negative, due to retirement or reduced working hours, but it could also be 
positive, due to the receipt of private pension and Social Security income. Given the well-documented 
positive association between income and stockholding, a reduced (increased) level of income at age 65 
would tend to reduce (increase) our estimates of the effect of Medicare on financial risk-taking. When 
we perform a sharp RD estimation for income, however, we find no evidence of any change at age 65 
(results are shown in columns 13-16 of Table 6 for income transformed used the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation). BJ report the same result with data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and 
the Health Tracking Household Survey. We thus conclude that our estimates of the effect of Medicare 
on stockholding are unlikely to be affected by any income developments at that age. 
Another factor that might change at age 65 and might affect stockholding would be the decision 
to retire. It is not theoretically obvious why retirement should induce someone to acquire stocks. In fact, 
retirement could well reduce stockholding if individuals liquidate their retirement accounts, through 
which they could have invested in stocks. In addition, empirical findings typically suggest either no 
association between stock ownership retirement (e.g., see the contributions in Guiso, Haliassos and 
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Jappelli, 2001), or a negative one (see, e.g., Addoum, 2017, who, like us, uses the HRS). On the other 
hand, some individuals who retire might roll over their retirement accounts in mutual funds that invest 
in stocks. At any rate, when we graph the data in Figure 3 (local linear regression lines are also 
included), we observe no spike in the prevalence of retirement at age 65. 24 Moreover, and to check 
whether there is a significant increase in the proportion of retiree at 65, we perform a sharp RD 
estimation for the decision to retire. Results are shown in columns 17-20 of Table 6, and clearly indicate 
that one cannot reject the null of no spike in retirement at 65. Reassuringly, this conclusion has also 
been reached by other authors using alternative datasets. Specifically, similar smooth employment-
related outcomes have been uncovered by CDM using both the National Health Interview Survey and 
the March CPS, and by BJ using both the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and the Health Tracking 
Household Survey. Hence, our finding that Medicare increases stockholding for the college-educated 
household should not be affected by their retirement decisions around 65. 
As discussed in Section 3.2 we choose to measure age bimonthly for our baseline specifications. 
We also performed our FRD estimation, however, with age measured in quarterly and in months. The 
results for the former case are displayed in Appendix Table A.2, while those for the latter in Appendix 
Table A.3 The conclusions are essentially the same as those reached in Section 4: Medicare eligibility 
significantly rises stockholding for college-educated households and its median estimated effect is 
economically relevant, as it ranges approximately from 7 to 15 percentage points for both directly held 
stocks and stocks held in any form.  
To see whether our results differ by the insurance one had before age 65, we repeated our analyses 
for households with at least one member uninsured before getting Medicare and before age 65 and 
compared results to those obtained using households with no such uninsured members. In line with 
intuition and with the fact that risk reduction is likely larger for households with members who had no 
insurance prior to 65, the estimated effects are much larger for such households in the college-educated 
subsample. However, these estimates for the uninsured subsample, while statistically significant, have 
                                                            
24 Given that both our outcomes and our treatment are defined at the household level, we define retirement at the 




wide confidence intervals due to the small sample size (there are few uninsured among the college-
educated). These confidence intervals include by a wide margin the point estimate of the subsample of 
households in which all members had insurance before Medicare and before age 65, and thus we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the effect of the onset of Medicare does not differ between the two groups 
of households. 
On the other hand, for households with no college graduate we still find no significant effect of 
Medicare on stockholding either for the previously insured or for the previously uninsured subsamples. 
This suggests that the higher participation costs of stockholding for these households dominates the 
effect of the reduction in background risk.  
We also did a sample split by cognition, as the latter has been strongly positively associated with 
stockholding (see, e.g. Christelis et al, 2010). In particular, we used the delayed recall test in the HRS, 
during which households are asked to repeat 10 words that have been read to them earlier in the 
interview. We split the sample in approximately two equal subsamples using a score of 5 words as the 
threshold.  
For households with higher scores the estimates are strongly statistically significant, while for 
households with lower scores they are not. However, the magnitudes of the CCT estimates are similar 
in the two household groups. The difference in the statistical significance is again suggestive evidence 
that higher cognition households are more likely to appreciate the reduction in background risk that 
having Medicare entails, which is what one would a priori expect. On the other hand, the fact that the 
CCT estimates for the low cognition households are similar to the estimates for the higher cognition 
ones suggests that the differences are not statistically significant, which in turn could be due to the small 
sample of lower cognition households with college education. 
In addition, we experimented with adding higher order age polynomial terms to our local 
regression specification, as recommended by LL. We tried polynomials of order two and our results did 
not change.25   
                                                            




Finally, given that our outcome is a binary variable, we estimate non-linear binary choice models. 
As Medicare eligibility is also a binary variable that needs to be instrumented for a FRD estimation, we 
used a bivariate probit model in which the second equation had Medicare eligibility as an outcome and 
a dummy variable for being over 65 as the excluded instrument. We find that the marginal effects of 
Medicare on stockholding obtained through this model are very close to those obtained from the local 
linear regression. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
Economic theory predicts that a reduction in health-related background risk should induce 
financial risk-taking, particularly so for households who are subject to relatively low stock market 
participation costs. We investigate this largely understudied but quite topical issue in a set-up that allows 
for credible identification of the relevant effect. Specifically, we utilize data on older individuals who 
control a significant fraction of society’s economic resources, at the time they get covered by a 
comprehensive public health insurance program. To identify the causal effect of interest, we employ a 
regression discontinuity design that exploits the discontinuity in health insurance coverage and 
generosity due to the onset of Medicare. 
We find that Medicare eligibility has a quantitatively and statistically significant impact on 
stockholding for the college-educated households. In contrast, our results indicate that the onset of 
Medicare does not significantly alter the financial risk-taking behavior of households whose members 
have not finished college. Taken together, our results suggest that the reduction in background risk due 
to Medicare suffices for overcoming all stock market participation costs (both informational and 
pecuniary) when such costs are relatively low, as is the case for the higher educated.  
As discussed, our estimates may be conservative estimates of the true effect of Medicare on 
financial risk-taking. This is so both because households might anticipate the stockholding decision 
before age 65 and because the influence of Medicare on financial risk-taking might not occur 
immediately at age 65, but rather over a longer period. 
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Our findings suggest that future reforms to Medicare (e.g., with respect to the extent of coverage 
and/or the age of eligibility) are, inter alia, likely to influence households’ financial risk-taking behavior 
and, more broadly, the size and composition of the population of stockholders. Hence, policy-makers 
may want to consider this implication when contemplating any such reforms. Likewise, if they are 
concerned about the low prevalence of stock holding, then they need to examine the extent to which it 
is due to poor health insurance coverage.  
Large public policy interventions have often implications for wealth inequality. In our context, if 
better educated households, following the onset of Medicare, become increasingly more likely to invest 
in an asset with large risk-adjusted returns (as the equity premium suggests), then the discrepancy in 
wealth between them and their less educated counterparts is likely to become larger. 
Finally, to the extent that our results can be generalized to include others kinds of background 
risk (e.g., due to unemployment), they imply that facilitating broader insurance coverage for such risks 
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Table 1. Ownership rate of stocks held in different investment vehicles,  











Stocks held directly 
or through mutual 
funds
29.2% 48.7% 24.6% 4.7%
Stocks held in any 
form
44.9% 71.4% 39.3% 8.8%
Number of 
observations
32,227 8,078 18,376 5,773
 
 
Notes: Ownership rates are calculated using sample weights. All figures are at the household-level. 
In the case of couples, the education level is defined as the maximum level over the two 
spouses/partners. The ownership rate of stocks held in any form includes direct stockholding, stocks 
held through mutual funds, and stocks held through Individual Retirement Accounts. The data come 






Table 2. Ownership of stocks, fuzzy RD 




























0.0271 0.0185 0.1437 32,555 0.1111 0.0373 0.0029 5,525 -0.0283 0.0285 0.3203 15,513 0.0177 0.0310 0.5672 5,815
64-65 0.0080 0.0125 0.5361 6,474 0.1594 0.0449 0.0045 1,626 -0.0742 0.0301 0.0315 3,702 -0.0627 0.0384 0.1311 1,146
63-66 0.0256 0.0123 0.0485 12,906 0.1162 0.0340 0.0024 3,230 -0.0197 0.0274 0.4797 7,334 0.0107 0.0276 0.7010 2,342
62-67 0.0065 0.0118 0.5889 19,360 0.0642 0.0322 0.0540 4,884 -0.0149 0.0241 0.5406 11,002 -0.0023 0.0263 0.9322 3,474
61-68 0.0239 0.0124 0.0606 25,759 0.0700 0.0280 0.0158 6,453 0.0022 0.0218 0.9184 14,696 0.0125 0.0184 0.5013 4,610




0.0473 0.0227 0.0371 29,353 0.1477 0.0302 0.0000 6,306 -0.0126 0.0284 0.6577 17,335 0.0800 0.0458 0.0808 5,441
64-65 0.0523 0.0283 0.0921 6,474 0.1612 0.0555 0.0144 1,626 -0.0148 0.0314 0.6476 3,702 -0.0333 0.0567 0.5690 1,146
63-66 0.0469 0.0209 0.0348 12,906 0.1176 0.0472 0.0203 3,230 0.0052 0.0309 0.8677 7,334 0.0570 0.0420 0.1885 2,342
62-67 0.0235 0.0192 0.2294 19,360 0.0642 0.0389 0.1074 4,884 0.0121 0.0264 0.6488 11,002 0.0170 0.0371 0.6492 3,474
61-68 0.0363 0.0173 0.0411 25,759 0.0704 0.0337 0.0421 6,453 0.0171 0.0226 0.4539 14,696 0.0399 0.0286 0.1698 4,610
60-69 0.0306 0.0157 0.0564 32,227 0.0552 0.0287 0.0591 8,078 0.0220 0.0212 0.3037 18,376 0.0291 0.0249 0.2479 5,773





Full Sample College graduates High School Graduates Less than High School Education
Panel B. Total Stockholding
Panel B.1. Robust RD
Panel B.2. Local Linear Regression
Panel A.1. Robust RD
Panel A.2. Local Linear Regression
 
Notes: Panel A reports results for direct stockholding (that is, stocks held directly or through mutual funds), while Panel B reports results for total stockholding or stocks held 
in any form (that is, direct stockholding plus stocks held through Investment Retirement Accounts). Estimates in Panels A.1. and B.1 are derived through fuzzy RD using the 
methodology proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) to choose the optimal bandwidth, while Panels A.2 and B.2 present fuzzy RD local linear regression results 
for each age interval indicated. Age is measured in bi-monthly intervals. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3. Ownership of stocks, sharp RD 




























0.0118 0.0130 0.3648 26,161 0.0787 0.0248 0.0015 5,525 -0.0357 0.0189 0.0591 10,624 0.0023 0.0193 0.9069 4,467
64-65 0.0047 0.0079 0.5631 6,474 0.1107 0.0294 0.0032 1,626 -0.0453 0.0186 0.0333 3,702 -0.0268 0.0209 0.2249 1,146
63-66 0.0161 0.0083 0.0641 12,906 0.0846 0.0253 0.0028 3,230 -0.0124 0.0176 0.4858 7,334 0.0053 0.0138 0.7035 2,342
62-67 0.0042 0.0078 0.5955 19,360 0.0478 0.0242 0.0564 4,884 -0.0096 0.0158 0.5451 11,002 -0.0011 0.0133 0.9334 3,474
61-68 0.0157 0.0084 0.0669 25,759 0.0528 0.0212 0.0164 6,453 0.0015 0.0145 0.9193 14,696 0.0065 0.0096 0.5008 4,610




0.0242 0.0157 0.1220 25,073 0.1008 0.0235 0.0000 5,278 -0.0166 0.0194 0.3936 13,722 0.0422 0.0230 0.0663 5,815
64-65 0.0309 0.0182 0.1178 6,474 0.1119 0.0413 0.0204 1,626 -0.0090 0.0200 0.6605 3,702 -0.0142 0.0264 0.6005 1,146
63-66 0.0295 0.0136 0.0409 12,906 0.0856 0.0357 0.0250 3,230 0.0033 0.0200 0.8706 7,334 0.0282 0.0211 0.1953 2,342
62-67 0.0151 0.0125 0.2363 19,360 0.0477 0.0295 0.1140 4,884 0.0079 0.0174 0.6537 11,002 0.0084 0.0186 0.6536 3,474
61-68 0.0238 0.0115 0.0449 25,759 0.0531 0.0258 0.0449 6,453 0.0112 0.0151 0.4594 14,696 0.0208 0.0150 0.1729 4,610
60-69 0.0204 0.0106 0.0595 32,227 0.0426 0.0223 0.0607 8,078 0.0147 0.0143 0.3089 18,376 0.0152 0.0131 0.2493 5,773
Panel B.2. Local Linear Regression





Panel A. Direct Stockholding
Panel A.1. Robust RD
Panel A.2. Local Linear Regression
Panel B. Total Stockholding
Panel B.1. Robust RD
 
Notes: Panel A reports results for direct stockholding (that is, stocks held directly or through mutual funds), while Panel B reports results for total stockholding or stocks held 
in any form (that is, direct stockholding plus stocks held through Investment Retirement Accounts). Estimates in Panels A.1. and B.1 are derived through sharp RD using the 
methodology proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) to choose the optimal bandwidth, while Panels A.2 and B.2 present sharp RD local linear regression results 
for each age interval indicated. Age is measured in bi-monthly intervals. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 4. Ownership of stocks, placebo tests using alternative age thresholds, fuzzy RD, 
college-educated subsample 
 













62 -0.296 0.852 0.729 2,586 -0.642 1.570 0.682 2,586
62.5 1.964 2.058 0.340 3,475 0.652 1.857 0.726 3,327
63 2.537 1.640 0.122 3,614 -0.399 0.667 0.550 2,422
63.5 -2.602 1,206.818 0.998 3,140 -59.029 66.034 0.371 2,996
64 -0.654 1.013 0.519 3,795 -1.221 1.810 0.500 3,525
66 -3.604 7.041 0.609 6,893 -1.217 3.146 0.699 4,966
66.5 -2.723 1.697 0.109 5,173 -2.778 3.288 0.398 5,518
67 -0.307 0.492 0.533 3,506 -1.453 0.630 0.021 4,003
67.5 0.462 3.738 0.902 3,873 -0.263 0.448 0.557 4,876
68 -4.025 10.497 0.701 5,221 1.334 2.552 0.601 4,371
62 7.202 30.794 0.815 5,105 9.425 36.237 0.795 5,105
62.5 -32.610 555.441 0.953 4,205 -13.489 226.779 0.953 4,205
63 -4.416 2.873 0.124 3,353 -4.631 3.558 0.193 3,353
63.5 -0.979 1.286 0.447 2,482 -0.628 1.490 0.674 2,482
64 -1.198 1.807 0.507 1,643 0.010 2.162 0.996 1,643
66 0.089 0.741 0.904 1,584 -0.612 0.930 0.511 1,584
66.5 -0.038 1.186 0.975 2,398 1.396 1.997 0.485 2,398
67 -2.561 4.276 0.549 3,094 -1.404 2.478 0.571 3,094
67.5 -7.539 45.578 0.869 3,862 -0.367 6.528 0.955 3,862
68 -0.394 1.771 0.824 4,609 0.222 1.489 0.882 4,609
Panel B. Local Linear Regression
Panel A. Robust RD





Notes: The table shows fuzzy RD estimates for the college-educated subsample using the methodology proposed 
by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) (Panel A), and local linear regression (Panel B). The following age 
ranges are used: [59,65), [60,65), [61,65), [62, 65), [63,65), [65,67), [65,68), [65, 69), [65, 70), and [65, 71). In 
each age range a placebo RD threshold is created at the midpoint. Age is measured in bimonthly intervals. ***, 
**, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 5. Ownership of stocks, fuzzy RD, with additional covariates 




























0.0213 0.0179 0.2334 28,278 0.0965 0.0339 0.0044 6,572 -0.0188 0.0270 0.4872 15,509 0.0106 0.0316 0.7367 5,249
64-65 -0.0117 0.0089 0.2155 6,473 0.1159 0.0410 0.0165 1,626 -0.0663 0.0361 0.0938 3,702 -0.0842 0.0329 0.0263 1,145
63-66 0.0076 0.0102 0.4675 12,902 0.0869 0.0290 0.0065 3,230 -0.0255 0.0276 0.3652 7,333 -0.0017 0.0246 0.9461 2,339
62-67 0.0006 0.0100 0.9561 19,351 0.0533 0.0258 0.0462 4,884 -0.0172 0.0234 0.4687 10,999 -0.0087 0.0249 0.7286 3,468
61-68 0.0128 0.0095 0.1855 25,745 0.0525 0.0230 0.0269 6,453 -0.0017 0.0200 0.9345 14,692 0.0063 0.0175 0.7221 4,600




0.0308 0.0201 0.1256 20,887 0.1349 0.0281 0.0000 7,387 -0.0064 0.0242 0.7917 16,123 0.0687 0.0427 0.1077 5,048
64-65 0.0281 0.0217 0.2223 6,473 0.1299 0.0488 0.0221 1,626 0.0001 0.0328 0.9980 3,702 -0.0712 0.0450 0.1416 1,145
63-66 0.0232 0.0169 0.1837 12,902 0.0889 0.0393 0.0336 3,230 -0.0021 0.0285 0.9431 7,333 0.0366 0.0385 0.3520 2,339
62-67 0.0158 0.0154 0.3131 19,351 0.0546 0.0316 0.0927 4,884 0.0084 0.0232 0.7189 10,999 0.0068 0.0348 0.8461 3,468
61-68 0.0205 0.0136 0.1379 25,745 0.0506 0.0272 0.0688 6,453 0.0102 0.0197 0.6078 14,692 0.0283 0.0271 0.3007 4,600
60-69 0.0182 0.0124 0.1488 32,210 0.0409 0.0228 0.0781 8,078 0.0132 0.0185 0.4781 18,371 0.0219 0.0238 0.3613 5,761
Panel B.2. Local Linear Regression





Panel A. Direct Stockholding
Panel A.1. Robust RD
Panel A.2. Local Linear Regression
Panel B. Total Stockholding
Panel B.1. Robust RD
 
Notes: Panel A reports results for Estimates in Panels A.1. and B.1 are derived through fuzzy RD using the methodology proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) 
to choose the optimal bandwidth, while Panels A.2 and B.2 present fuzzy RD local linear regression results for each age interval indicated. The specification includes the 
following additional covariates, other than age-related terms and an indicator for having Medicare: time dummies, being white, being in a couple, having at least one limitation 
in daily living activities, and income quartiles. Age is measured in bi-monthly intervals. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 6. Additional outcomes 


































0.0728 0.0533 0.1719 4,996 0.0493 0.2643 0.8521 3,804 -0.0362 0.1832 0.8435 4,182 -0.1363 0.2005 0.4965 5,525 0.0029 0.0391 0.9400 5,814
64-65 0.0749 0.0612 0.2461 1,626 0.3125 0.3675 0.4133 795 -0.1035 0.2578 0.6956 1,123 0.1954 0.1219 0.1371 1,626 0.0615 0.0390 0.1428 1,626
63-66 0.0350 0.0440 0.4342 3,230 0.0107 0.2893 0.9709 1,576 -0.0278 0.1887 0.8843 2,243 0.0734 0.1321 0.5837 3,230 0.0139 0.0314 0.6623 3,230
62-67 0.0399 0.0362 0.2776 4,884 0.0987 0.2358 0.6781 2,360 -0.0080 0.1607 0.9608 3,362 -0.0677 0.1206 0.5781 4,884 0.0115 0.0251 0.6490 4,884
61-68 0.0247 0.0291 0.3998 6,453 -0.0019 0.2054 0.9926 3,111 0.0124 0.1276 0.9233 4,442 0.0668 0.1087 0.5417 6,453 -0.0060 0.0222 0.7869 6,453
60-69 0.0307 0.0264 0.2497 8,078 -0.0288 0.1709 0.8668 3,879 -0.0015 0.1107 0.9891 5,538 0.1306 0.0988 0.1916 8,078 0.0053 0.0191 0.7817 8,078
Retirement
Panel A. Robust RD






Amounts of stocks held directly 
or through mutual funds, 
conditional on ownership        
(in logarithms)
Amounts of all stocks, 




Notes: The outcomes shown include i) bond ownership; ii) amount (in logs) of stocks held directly or through mutual funds, conditional on ownership; iii) amount (in logs) of 
stocks held in any form, conditional on ownership; iv) household income (transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation); v) retirement, denoted by a binary 
variable indicating whether any of the two partners is retired. Estimates in Panel A are derived using the methodology proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) to 
choose the optimal bandwidth, while Panel B presents local linear regression results for each age interval indicated. We use fuzzy RD for outcomes i), ii) and iii), while sharp 




Table A.1. P values of F tests of different age measurement units 
64-65 0.2324 0.2510 0.4870 0.2313 0.5128 0.3154 0.5907 0.3000 0.5667 0.4255 0.5038 0.0047 *** 0.6793 0.4534 0.5238 0.0001 ***
63-66 0.4001 0.2149 0.7991 0.4116 0.6740 0.1825 0.8606 0.7039 0.7052 0.3005 0.7483 0.0027 *** 0.4414 0.3655 0.6349 0.0000 ***
62-67 0.5725 0.2096 0.9012 0.4909 0.8091 0.2282 0.4794 0.1308 0.8093 0.4341 0.5232 0.0000 *** 0.6020 0.5028 0.3988 0.0000 ***
61-68 0.5216 0.0488 ** 0.6642 0.6119 0.8273 0.0794 * 0.3022 0.1099 0.7891 0.1335 0.3251 0.0001 *** 0.6187 0.2098 0.2596 0.0000 ***
60-69 0.6184 0.0100 ** 0.5877 0.6082 0.9068 0.0536 * 0.2987 0.1397 0.9062 0.0838 * 0.3400 0.0002 *** 0.8269 0.1574 0.3028 0.0000 ***
64-65 0.8386 0.0664 * 0.5811 0.2463 0.9150 0.0235 ** 0.5451 0.0405 ** 0.9170 0.0144 ** 0.6471 0.0005 *** 0.9438 0.0269 ** 0.7426 0.0000 ***
63-66 0.9014 0.1170 0.6345 0.2111 0.8083 0.0279 ** 0.3602 0.0782 * 0.8326 0.0172 ** 0.4042 0.0020 *** 0.5123 0.0226 ** 0.4855 0.0000 ***
62-67 0.9123 0.1070 0.8015 0.1060 0.9145 0.0401 ** 0.3677 0.0017 *** 0.7853 0.0404 ** 0.4066 0.0000 *** 0.4201 0.0664 * 0.4459 0.0000 ***
61-68 0.9519 0.2195 0.6722 0.2644 0.9391 0.1150 0.4626 0.0018 *** 0.8279 0.0711 * 0.5228 0.0000 *** 0.4891 0.1234 0.5353 0.0000 ***
















































Age measured in years
P-value
Panel A. Stocks held directly or through mutual funds 
Panel B. Stocks held in any form
P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-valueP-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value
 
Notes: The table shows p-values of the F-tests of coefficients of monthly dummies in regressions in which the dependent variable is stockholding.  ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table A.2. Ownership of stocks, fuzzy RD, age measured in quarters 




























0.0136 0.0277 0.6241 23,278 0.1099 0.0440 0.0125 5,456 -0.0368 0.0291 0.2064 15,068 0.0170 0.0319 0.5951 5,859
64-65 0.0059 0.0294 0.8464 6,474 0.1699 0.0360 0.0022 1,626 -0.0916 0.0257 0.0092 3,702 -0.0727 0.0294 0.0427 1,146
63-66 0.0237 0.0192 0.2374 12,906 0.1190 0.0220 0.0001 3,230 -0.0254 0.0299 0.4091 7,334 0.0083 0.0291 0.7808 2,342
62-67 0.0056 0.0168 0.7409 19,360 0.0628 0.0269 0.0286 4,884 -0.0171 0.0255 0.5084 11,002 -0.0042 0.0254 0.8688 3,474
61-68 0.0235 0.0153 0.1346 25,759 0.0678 0.0241 0.0085 6,453 0.0020 0.0242 0.9352 14,696 0.0114 0.0217 0.6041 4,610




0.0416 0.0255 0.1029 24,797 0.1599 0.0309 0.0000 3,854 -0.0192 0.0249 0.4415 16,887 0.0780 0.0454 0.0856 5,317
64-65 0.0567 0.0202 0.0260 6,474 0.1769 0.0329 0.0010 1,626 -0.0288 0.0203 0.2000 3,702 -0.0375 0.0420 0.4013 1,146
63-66 0.0461 0.0163 0.0128 12,906 0.1194 0.0360 0.0047 3,230 0.0021 0.0240 0.9300 7,334 0.0533 0.0351 0.1494 2,342
62-67 0.0226 0.0207 0.2863 19,360 0.0630 0.0332 0.0708 4,884 0.0100 0.0237 0.6781 11,002 0.0118 0.0305 0.7020 3,474
61-68 0.0363 0.0170 0.0411 25,759 0.0692 0.0291 0.0235 6,453 0.0169 0.0205 0.4157 14,696 0.0378 0.0272 0.1740 4,610
60-69 0.0300 0.0156 0.0623 32,227 0.0536 0.0257 0.0438 8,078 0.0212 0.0183 0.2536 18,376 0.0274 0.0237 0.2531 5,773
Panel B.2. Local Linear Regression





Panel A. Direct Stockholding
Panel A.1. Robust RD
Panel A.2. Local Linear Regression
Panel B. Total Stockholding
Panel B.1. Robust RD
 
Notes: Panel A reports results for direct stockholding (that is, stocks held directly or through mutual funds), while Panel B reports results for total stockholding or stocks held 
in any form (that is, direct stockholding plus stocks held through Investment Retirement Accounts). Estimates in Panels A.1. and B.1 are derived through fuzzy RD using the 
methodology proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) to choose the optimal bandwidth, while Panels A.2 and B.2 present fuzzy RD local linear regression results 
for each age interval indicated. Age is measured in quarterly intervals. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table A.3. Ownership of stocks, fuzzy RD, age measured in months 




























0.0259 0.0217 0.2315 30,685 0.1174 0.0491 0.0168 5,754 -0.0255 0.0275 0.3538 15,953 0.0176 0.0313 0.5736 6,192
64-65 0.0059 0.0294 0.8464 6,474 0.1699 0.0360 0.0022 1,626 -0.0916 0.0257 0.0092 3,702 -0.0727 0.0294 0.0427 1,146
63-66 0.0237 0.0192 0.2374 12,906 0.1190 0.0220 0.0001 3,230 -0.0254 0.0299 0.4091 7,334 0.0083 0.0291 0.7808 2,342
62-67 0.0056 0.0168 0.7409 19,360 0.0628 0.0269 0.0286 4,884 -0.0171 0.0255 0.5084 11,002 -0.0042 0.0254 0.8688 3,474
61-68 0.0235 0.0153 0.1346 25,759 0.0678 0.0241 0.0085 6,453 0.0020 0.0242 0.9352 14,696 0.0114 0.0217 0.6041 4,610




0.0462 0.0221 0.0365 27,487 0.1474 0.0440 0.0008 6,130 -0.0143 0.0300 0.6326 16,573 0.0802 0.0493 0.1039 5,488
64-65 0.0567 0.0202 0.0260 6,474 0.1769 0.0329 0.0010 1,626 -0.0288 0.0203 0.2000 3,702 -0.0375 0.0420 0.4013 1,146
63-66 0.0461 0.0163 0.0128 12,906 0.1194 0.0360 0.0047 3,230 0.0021 0.0240 0.9300 7,334 0.0533 0.0351 0.1494 2,342
62-67 0.0226 0.0207 0.2863 19,360 0.0630 0.0332 0.0708 4,884 0.0100 0.0237 0.6781 11,002 0.0118 0.0305 0.7020 3,474
61-68 0.0363 0.0170 0.0411 25,759 0.0692 0.0291 0.0235 6,453 0.0169 0.0205 0.4157 14,696 0.0378 0.0272 0.1740 4,610
60-69 0.0300 0.0156 0.0623 32,227 0.0536 0.0257 0.0438 8,078 0.0212 0.0183 0.2536 18,376 0.0274 0.0237 0.2531 5,773
Panel B.2. Local Linear Regression





Panel A. Direct Stockholding
Panel A.1. Robust RD
Panel A.2. Local Linear Regression
Panel B. Total Stockholding
Panel B.1. Robust RD
 
Notes: Panel A reports results for direct stockholding (that is, stocks held directly or through mutual funds), while Panel B reports results for total stockholding or stocks held 
in any form (that is, direct stockholding plus stocks held through Investment Retirement Accounts). Estimates in Panels A.1. and B.1 are derived through fuzzy RD using the 
methodology proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) to choose the optimal bandwidth, while Panels A.2 and B.2 present fuzzy RD local linear regression results 
for each age interval indicated. Age is measured in months. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table A.4. Ownership of stocks, households with at least one of the two partners  
having neither Medicare nor other health insurance before age 65, fuzzy RD 




























-0.0023 0.0659 0.9722 4,700 0.2573 0.1345 0.0558 572 -0.0806 0.0949 0.3957 2,395 -0.0184 0.0686 0.7889 1,443
64-65 -0.0022 0.0767 0.9780 1,122 0.4065 0.1188 0.0057 124 -0.1599 0.1140 0.1884 633 0.0000 0.0529 0.9997 365
63-66 0.0272 0.0512 0.6006 2,236 0.2648 0.1305 0.0542 253 -0.0263 0.0751 0.7294 1,219 0.0058 0.0330 0.8612 764
62-67 0.0327 0.0397 0.4156 3,355 0.1629 0.1225 0.1921 378 0.0148 0.0581 0.8009 1,855 0.0078 0.0283 0.7853 1,122
61-68 0.0394 0.0351 0.2673 4,444 0.1879 0.1048 0.0795 484 0.0184 0.0493 0.7101 2,479 0.0234 0.0227 0.3095 1,481




-0.0110 0.0558 0.8442 3,608 0.3044 0.1387 0.0282 646 -0.1007 0.0922 0.2744 2,395 0.0723 0.0649 0.2658 1,752
64-65 0.0246 0.0580 0.6799 1,122 0.2470 0.1181 0.0605 124 -0.1170 0.1312 0.3916 633 0.0468 0.0493 0.3637 365
63-66 0.0138 0.0379 0.7193 2,236 0.1489 0.1109 0.1926 253 -0.0617 0.0785 0.4398 1,219 0.0547 0.0321 0.1015 764
62-67 0.0187 0.0325 0.5685 3,355 0.1119 0.1001 0.2714 378 -0.0002 0.0604 0.9976 1,855 0.0080 0.0333 0.8104 1,122
61-68 0.0232 0.0291 0.4276 4,444 0.1318 0.0928 0.1619 484 -0.0050 0.0477 0.9168 2,479 0.0395 0.0266 0.1444 1,481
60-69 0.0294 0.0246 0.2360 5,544 0.1567 0.0840 0.0670 607 0.0072 0.0405 0.8595 3,085 0.0267 0.0246 0.2816 1,852





Full Sample College Graduates High School Graduates Less than High School Education
Panel A. Direct Stockholding
Panel A.1. Robust RD
Panel A.2. Local Linear Regression
Panel B. Total Stockholding
Panel B.1. Robust RD
 
Notes: The sample consists of households with at least one of the two partners having neither Medicare nor other health insurance before age 65. Panel A reports results for 
direct stockholding (that is, stocks held directly or through mutual funds), while Panel B reports results for total stockholding or stocks held in any form (that is, direct 
stockholding plus stocks held through Investment Retirement Accounts). Estimates in Panels A.1. and B.1 are derived through fuzzy RD using the methodology proposed by 
Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) to choose the optimal bandwidth, while Panels A.2 and B.2 present fuzzy RD local linear regression results for each age interval 
indicated. Age is measured in bimonthly intervals. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table A.5. Ownership of stocks, households with both partners having health insurance (but not Medicare) before age 65, fuzzy RD 




























0.0124 0.0209 0.5510 13,535 0.1085 0.0369 0.0033 5,060 -0.0424 0.0307 0.1671 7,006 0.0268 0.0365 0.4630 1,757
64-65 0.0338 0.0130 0.0245 4,785 0.1466 0.0588 0.0299 1,449 -0.0366 0.0316 0.2708 2,766 -0.0826 0.0604 0.1985 570
63-66 0.0296 0.0145 0.0529 9,457 0.1082 0.0405 0.0136 2,856 -0.0205 0.0280 0.4709 5,462 0.0141 0.0412 0.7358 1,139
62-67 0.0140 0.0125 0.2712 13,999 0.0701 0.0352 0.0541 4,259 -0.0152 0.0250 0.5490 8,075 -0.0095 0.0328 0.7730 1,665
61-68 0.0250 0.0119 0.0407 18,411 0.0607 0.0316 0.0605 5,590 -0.0019 0.0213 0.9289 10,641 -0.0033 0.0250 0.8944 2,180




0.0413 0.0313 0.1861 12,083 0.1374 0.0332 0.0000 5,060 -0.0254 0.0413 0.5382 8,259 0.0528 0.0566 0.3508 1,937
64-65 0.0764 0.0315 0.0338 4,785 0.1697 0.0553 0.0107 1,449 0.0136 0.0411 0.7474 2,766 -0.0865 0.1105 0.4499 570
63-66 0.0549 0.0271 0.0549 9,457 0.1254 0.0505 0.0209 2,856 0.0104 0.0397 0.7958 5,462 0.0199 0.0654 0.7633 1,139
62-67 0.0311 0.0217 0.1604 13,999 0.0732 0.0400 0.0761 4,259 0.0108 0.0342 0.7536 8,075 -0.0035 0.0504 0.9456 1,665
61-68 0.0412 0.0189 0.0344 18,411 0.0693 0.0360 0.0606 5,590 0.0140 0.0297 0.6401 10,641 0.0144 0.0386 0.7113 2,180
60-69 0.0335 0.0183 0.0718 22,731 0.0535 0.0317 0.0967 6,922 0.0163 0.0273 0.5518 13,145 0.0025 0.0348 0.9430 2,664





Full Sample College Graduates High School Graduates Less than High School Education
Panel A. Direct Stockholding
Panel A.1. Robust RD
Panel A.2. Local Linear Regression
Panel B. Total Stockholding
Panel B.1. Robust RD
 
Notes: The sample consists of households with both partners having health insurance (but not Medicare) before age 65. Panel A reports results for direct stockholding (that is, 
stocks held directly or through mutual funds), while Panel B reports results for total stockholding or stocks held in any form (that is, direct stockholding plus stocks held through 
Investment Retirement Accounts). Estimates in Panels A.1. and B.1 are derived through fuzzy RD using the methodology proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) 
to choose the optimal bandwidth, while Panels A.2 and B.2 present fuzzy RD local linear regression results for each age interval indicated. Age is measured in bimonthly 
intervals. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table A.6. Ownership of stocks, households with a maximum (between the two partners) delayed recall score equal to 5 or above, fuzzy RD 




























0.0192 0.0227 0.3974 14,858 0.1108 0.0443 0.0124 4,039 -0.0591 0.0400 0.1392 8,226 0.0689 0.0502 0.1705 2,205
64-65 0.0257 0.0205 0.2358 4,386 0.1770 0.0507 0.0051 1,399 -0.0867 0.0409 0.0574 2,544 0.0263 0.1068 0.8100 443
63-66 0.0484 0.0183 0.0146 8,725 0.1207 0.0399 0.0060 2,773 -0.0099 0.0381 0.7976 5,059 0.0758 0.0665 0.2660 893
62-67 0.0266 0.0155 0.0955 13,054 0.0841 0.0373 0.0306 4,172 -0.0095 0.0319 0.7664 7,567 0.0371 0.0574 0.5218 1,315
61-68 0.0410 0.0153 0.0103 17,337 0.0754 0.0321 0.0232 5,515 0.0069 0.0278 0.8045 10,082 0.0677 0.0405 0.1007 1,740




0.0659 0.0334 0.0481 12,672 0.1476 0.0404 0.0003 4,721 -0.0006 0.0451 0.9893 8,226 0.1566 0.0603 0.0094 2,134
64-65 0.0861 0.0457 0.0859 4,386 0.1909 0.0647 0.0132 1,399 -0.0144 0.0488 0.7731 2,544 0.1371 0.0513 0.0217 443
63-66 0.0911 0.0320 0.0091 8,725 0.1210 0.0574 0.0462 2,773 0.0469 0.0425 0.2813 5,059 0.1888 0.0508 0.0011 893
62-67 0.0699 0.0252 0.0089 13,054 0.0987 0.0456 0.0372 4,172 0.0493 0.0335 0.1509 7,567 0.0885 0.0515 0.0943 1,315
61-68 0.0718 0.0232 0.0034 17,337 0.0894 0.0398 0.0295 5,515 0.0398 0.0290 0.1769 10,082 0.1325 0.0379 0.0010 1,740
60-69 0.0584 0.0199 0.0047 21,537 0.0610 0.0342 0.0799 6,857 0.0470 0.0266 0.0826 12,502 0.0884 0.0360 0.0170 2,178





Full Sample College Graduates High School Graduates Less than High School Education
Panel A. Direct Stockholding
Panel A.1. Robust RD
Panel A.2. Local Linear Regression
Panel B. Total Stockholding
Panel B.1. Robust RD
 
Notes: The sample consists of households with a maximum (between the two partners) delayed recall score equal to 5 or above (out of 10). Panel A reports results for direct 
stockholding (that is, stocks held directly or through mutual funds), while Panel B reports results for total stockholding or stocks held in any form (that is, direct stockholding 
plus stocks held through Investment Retirement Accounts). Estimates in Panels A.1. and B.1 are derived through fuzzy RD using the methodology proposed by Calonico, 
Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) to choose the optimal bandwidth, while Panels A.2 and B.2 present fuzzy RD local linear regression results for each age interval indicated. Age 
is measured in bimonthly intervals. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table A.7. Ownership of stocks, households with a maximum (between the two partners) delayed recall score below 5, fuzzy RD 




























-0.0050 0.0419 0.9059 7,544 0.1247 0.0706 0.0775 1,039 -0.0221 0.0481 0.6459 5,773 -0.0443 0.0623 0.4774 2,838
64-65 -0.0589 0.0334 0.1056 2,003 0.0513 0.0976 0.6096 225 -0.0745 0.0438 0.1167 1,127 -0.1120 0.0501 0.0471 651
63-66 -0.0295 0.0273 0.2919 4,009 0.0659 0.0688 0.3476 453 -0.0481 0.0321 0.1481 2,211 -0.0288 0.0415 0.4949 1,345
62-67 -0.0264 0.0254 0.3070 6,049 -0.0283 0.0511 0.5836 704 -0.0219 0.0358 0.5439 3,345 -0.0251 0.0338 0.4630 2,000
61-68 -0.0093 0.0238 0.6973 8,072 0.0326 0.0472 0.4937 926 -0.0087 0.0356 0.8071 4,487 -0.0138 0.0256 0.5924 2,659




-0.0698 0.0774 0.3672 6,852 0.1479 0.0985 0.1333 992 -0.0868 0.0595 0.1448 4,945 -0.0115 0.0894 0.8980 2,713
64-65 -0.0652 0.0673 0.3534 2,003 0.0124 0.0743 0.8706 225 -0.0658 0.0607 0.3020 1,127 -0.1362 0.0965 0.1859 651
63-66 -0.0661 0.0504 0.2024 4,009 0.1206 0.0727 0.1108 453 -0.1139 0.0509 0.0352 2,211 -0.0290 0.0733 0.6962 1,345
62-67 -0.0741 0.0422 0.0875 6,049 -0.0928 0.0548 0.0993 704 -0.0851 0.0476 0.0825 3,345 -0.0277 0.0619 0.6577 2,000
61-68 -0.0440 0.0339 0.2016 8,072 -0.0251 0.0493 0.6126 926 -0.0508 0.0408 0.2199 4,487 -0.0094 0.0471 0.8419 2,659
60-69 -0.0231 0.0312 0.4620 10,247 0.0448 0.0512 0.3851 1,200 -0.0410 0.0386 0.2917 5,711 -0.0001 0.0408 0.9971 3,336





Full Sample College Graduates High School Graduates Less than High School Education
Panel A. Direct Stockholding
Panel A.1. Robust RD
Panel A.2. Local Linear Regression
Panel B. Total Stockholding
Panel B.1. Robust RD
 
Notes: The sample consists of households with a maximum (between the two partners) delayed recall score below 5 (out of 10). Panel A reports results for direct stockholding 
(that is, stocks held directly or through mutual funds), while Panel B reports results for total stockholding or stocks held in any form (that is, direct stockholding plus stocks 
held through Investment Retirement Accounts). Estimates in Panels A.1. and B.1 are derived through fuzzy RD using the methodology proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and 
Titiunik (2014) to choose the optimal bandwidth, while Panels A.2 and B.2 present fuzzy RD local linear regression results for each age interval indicated. Age is measured in 
bimonthly intervals. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
